A reduction in in ‡ation can fuel run-ups in housing prices if people su¤er from money illusion. For example, investors who decide whether to rent or buy a house by simply comparing monthly rent and mortgage payments do not take into account the fact that in ‡ation lowers future real mortgage costs. We decompose the price-rent ratio into a rational component -meant to capture the "proxy e¤ect" and risk premia -and an implied mispricing. We …nd that in ‡ation and nominal interest rates explain a large share of the time-series variation of the mispricing, and that the tilt e¤ect is very unlikely to rationalize this …nding.
Introduction
Housing prices have reached unprecedented heights in recent years. Sharp run-ups followed by busts are a common feature of the time-series of housing prices. Figure  1 illustrates di¤erent real housing price indices and shows that this phenomenon has been observed in several countries.
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UK CA A U Panel A 1970 Panel A 1974 Panel A 1978 Panel A 1982 Panel A 1986 Panel A 1990 Panel A 1994 Panel A 1998 1970 1974 1978 1982 1986 1990 1994 1998 2002 Shiller (2005) documents similar patterns for other countries and cities over shorter samples. Moreover, Case and Shiller (1989, 1990) document that housing price changes are predictable and suggest that this might be due to ine¢ ciency in the housing market. There are several potential reasons for this market ine¢ ciency -one of them being money illusion, the inability to properly distinguish changes in nominal values due to changes in real fundamentals from changes merely due to in ‡ation. The housing market is particularly well suited to study money illusion, since frictions, e.g., short-sale constraints, make it di¢ cult for professional investors to arbitrage possible mispricings away.
In this paper we identify an empirical proxy for the mispricing in the housing market and show that it is largely explained by movements in in ‡ation. In ‡ation matters and it matters in a particular way. Our analysis shows that a reduction in in ‡ation can generate substantial increases in housing prices in a setting in which agents are prone to money illusion. For example, people who simply base the decision of whether to rent or buy a house on a comparison between monthly rent and monthly payment of a …xed nominal interest rate mortgage su¤er from money illusion. They mistakenly assume that real and nominal interest rates move in lockstep. Hence, they wrongly attribute a decrease in in ‡ation to a decline in the real interest rate and consequently underestimate the real cost of future mortgage payments. Therefore, they cause an upward pressure on housing prices when in ‡ation declines.
To identify whether the link between housing price movements and in ‡ation is due to money illusion, we …rst have to isolate the rational components of price changes that are due to movements in fundamentals, such as land and construction costs, housing quality, property taxes, and demographics [Mankiw and Weil (1989) ]. 1 We do so in two stages. First, we focus on the price-rent ratio to insulate our analysis from fundamental movements that a¤ect housing prices and rents symmetrically. Even though renting and buying a house are not perfect substitutes, the price-rent ratio implicitly controls for movements in the underlying service ‡ow. Second, we try to isolate rational channels through which in ‡ation could in ‡uence the price-rent ratio. Several authors including Fama (1981) have claimed that the negative relationship between in ‡ation and the price of real assets (like stocks) might be due to a "proxy e¤ect": high in ‡ation and/or high in ‡ation expectations are a bad signal about future economic conditions. Moreover, higher in ‡ation might make the economy more risky or agents more risk averse, generating a risk premium that is correlated with in ‡ation. Poterba (1984) stresses a rational channel that implies the opposite e¤ect of in ‡ation on house prices: an increase in in ‡ation reduces the after-tax real user cost of housing, potentially driving up housing demand. We use a Campbell and Shiller (1988) decomposition that takes into account housing-speci…c risk factors, (such as probability of moving interacted with cross-sectional variation of house prices), to decompose the price-rent ratio into rational components (expected future returns on housing investment and rent growth rates) and a mispricing component. After controlling for rational channels, we …nd that in ‡ation has substantial explanatory power for the sharp run-ups and downturns of the housing market. Figure 2 depicts the time series of the (estimated) mispricing component of the price-rent ratio in the U.K. housing market and its …tted values obtained using in ‡ation as the only explanatory variable. The …rst thing to notice is that the mispricing shows sharp and persistent run-ups during the sample period. Moreover, the …tted series closely tracks the mispricing. FITTED_INFSM 1967 1971 1979 1983 1987 1999 The close link between in ‡ation and housing prices could be due to a departure from rationality and/or …nancing frictions. First, as argued by Modigliani and Cohn (1979) , if agents su¤er from money illusion, their valuation of an asset will be inversely related to the overall level of in ‡ation in the economy.
MISPRICING
2 A special form of money illusion arises if home owners are averse to realizing nominal losses. Second, in an in ‡ationary environment, the nominal payments on a …xed-payment mortgage are higher by a factor that is roughly proportional to the reciprocal of the nominal interest rate. This causes the real …nancing cost to shift towards the early periods of the mortgage, therefore causing a potential reduction in housing demand and prices. This is the so-called tilt e¤ect of in ‡ation [see Lessard and Modigliani (1975) ; Tucker (1975) ]. Nevertheless, why the tilt e¤ect should matter cannot be fully explained in a rational setting since …nancial instruments that are immune to changes in in ‡ation, like the price level adjusted mortgage (PLAM) or the graduate payment mortgage (GPM), have been available to house buyers since at least the 1970s. Most importantly, in Section 4.1 we perform a series of tests that make it seem very unlikely that the tilt e¤ect is the driving force of the empirical link between in ‡ation and housing prices. Third, if …xed interest rate mortgages are not portable, individuals who have bought a house and have locked in a low nominal interest rate might be less willing to sell their current house to buy a better one when nominal interest rates are higher. Hence, an increase in in ‡ation that raises the nominal interest rate might depress the price of better-quality residential properties. On the other hand, a reduction in in ‡ation and nominal interest rates would free current home owners from this "lock-in" e¤ect. We provide evidence that the "lock-in" e¤ect is not driving our results. Further, we show that housing supply elasticity is heterogeneous across U.S. states due to di¤erences in population density. We demonstrate that given this heterogeneity in supply elasticity, money illusion can lead to heterogeneous regional price dynamics as observed in the data [e.g., Gyourko, Mayer, and Sinai (2006) ].
The balance of the paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the related literature on money illusion, market frictions and speculative trading. Section 3 formally analyzes the link between in ‡ation and housing prices using the U.K. housing market as a case study. 3 In particular, Subsection 3.1 provides a …rst assessment of the empirical link between price-rent ratio and in ‡ation. Subsection 3.2 decomposes the price-rent ratio isolating the rational channels from an estimated mispricing and shows that the mispricing is largely explained by changes in the rate of in ‡ation. Section 4 argues that market frictions -like the tilt e¤ect (Subsection 4.1) and lock-in e¤ect (Subsection 4.2) -are unlikely to be the cause of the link between in ‡ation and mispricing on the housing market. Section 5 con…rms the main empirical results using U.S. data and studies the heterogeneity of housing supply elasticity across the U.S. A …nal section concludes and a full description of the data sources, methodological details, and additional robustness checks are provided in the Appendix.
Related Literature

Money Illusion and Psychological Biases
"An economic theorist can, of course, commit no greater crime than to assume money illusion," Tobin (1972) .
"In fact, I am persuadable -indeed, pretty much persuaded -that money illusion is a fact of life, "Blinder (2000) .
In this section, we sketch the links to the existing literature. In particular, we review previous de…nitions of money illusion, relate it to the psychology literature, and summarize the empirical evidence on the e¤ect of money illusion on the stock market.
De…nition of Money Illusion. Fisher (1928, p. 4) de…nes money illusion as "the failure to perceive that the dollar, or any other unit of money, expands or shrinks in value." 4 Patinkin (1965, p. 22) refers to money illusion as any deviation from decision making in purely real terms: "An individual will be said to be su¤ering from such an illusion if his excess-demand functions for commodities do not depend [...] solely on relative prices and real wealth..." Leontief (1936) is more formal in his de…nition by arguing that there is no money illusion if demand and supply functions are homogeneous of degree zero in all nominal prices.
Related Psychological Biases. Money illusion is closely related to other psychological judgement and decision biases. In a perfect world, money is a veil and only real prices matter. Individuals face the same situation after doubling all nominal prices and wages. Nevertheless, psychological biases might not allow individuals to see through this veil.
The framing e¤ect states that alternative representations (framing) of the same decision problem can lead to substantially di¤erent behavior [Tversky and Kahneman (1981) ]. Sha…r, Diamond, and Tversky (1997) document that agents'preferences depend to a large degree on whether the problem is phrased in real terms or nominal terms. This framing e¤ect has implications for both time preferences and risk attitudes. For example, if the problem is phrased in nominal terms, agents prefer the nominally less risky option to the alternative, which is less risky in real terms. That is, they avoid nominal risk rather than real risk. On the other hand, if the problem is stated in real terms, their preference ranking reverses. The degree to which individuals ignore real terms depends on the relative saliency of the nominal versus real frame.
Anchoring is a special form of the framing e¤ect. It refers to the phenomenon that people tend to be unduly in ‡uenced by arbitrary quantities when presented with a decision problem. This is the case even when the quantity is clearly uninformative. For example, the nominal purchasing price of a house can serve as an anchor for a reference price even when the real price can be easily derived.
5 Genesove and Mayer (2001) document that investors are reluctant to realize nominal losses.
While individuals understand well that in ‡ation increases the prices of goods they buy, they often overlook in ‡ation e¤ects that work through indirect channels (e.g., general equilibrium e¤ects). For example, Shiller (1997a) documents survey evidence that the public does not think that nominal wages and in ‡ation comove over the longrun. Shiller (1997b) provides evidence that less than a third of the respondents in his survey study would have expected their nominal income to be higher if the U.S. had experienced higher in ‡ation over the last …ve years. The impact of in ‡ation on wages is more indirect. In ‡ation increases the nominal pro…ts of the …rm, therefore ceteris paribus it will increase nominal wages. Similarly, the reduction in mortgage rates due to a decline in expected future in ‡ation expectations is direct, while the fact that it will also lower future nominal income is indirect. This inattention to indirect e¤ects can be related to two well-known psychological judgement biases: mental accounting and cognitive dissonance. Mental accounting [Thaler (1980) ] is a close cousin of narrow framing and refers to the phenomenon that people keep track of gains and losses in di¤erent mental accounts. By doing so, they overlook the links between them. In our case, they ignore the fact that higher in ‡ation a¤ects the interest rate of the mortgage and the labor income growth rate in a symmetric way. Cognitive dissonance and the self attribution bias might be another reason why individuals do not realize that in ‡ation increases future nominal income: people have a tendency to attribute increases in nominal income to their own achievements than simply to higher in ‡ation. 
In ‡ation and the Stock Market
Several studies document a negative correlation between nominal stock returns and in ‡ation -realized and expected [e.g., Lintner (1975) ; Fama and Schwert (1977) ; Gultekin (1983) ] and unexpected [Amihud (1996) ]. This appears puzzling since the Fisher-relation implies that nominal rates should move one-for-one with expected in ‡a-tion. One interpretation of these …ndings is that in ‡ation proxies for future economic conditions: higher in ‡ation is associated with a grim economic outlook [e.g., Fama (1981) ]. On the other hand, it has been argued that the negative correlation might be due to money illusion. Modigliani and Cohn (1979) claim that prices signi…cantly depart from fundamentals since investors make two in ‡ation-induced judgement errors: (i) they tend to capitalize equity earnings at the nominal rate rather than the real rate and (ii) they fail to realize that …rms' corporate liabilities depreciate in real terms. Hence, stock prices are too low during high in ‡ation periods. There are many papers that empirically document the impact of money illusion on stock market prices, often referred to as the "Modigliani-Cohn" hypothesis. Ritter and Warr (2002) document that the value-price ratio is positively correlated with in ‡ation and that this e¤ect is more pronounced for leveraged …rms. Using Campbell and Shiller's (1988) dynamic log-linear valuation method and a subjective proxy for the equity risk premium, Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004) show in the time-series that a large part of the mispricing in the dividend-price ratio can be explained by in ‡ation illusion. 7 Cohen, Polk, and Vuolteenaho (2005) focus on the cross-sectional implications of money illusion on asset returns and …nd supportive evidence for the "Modigliani-Cohn"hypothesis. It is worth emphasizing that proxy e¤ect and money illusion are not mutually exclusive.
On the other hand, Boudoukh and Richardson (1993) …nd that at low frequency nominal market returns are positively correlated with in ‡ation consistently with the Fisher relation. This …nding is not inconsistent with money illusion: even though investors su¤ering from money illusion underestimate the nominal earnings growth of companies after an increase in in ‡ation, they should realize their mistake once the actual nominal earnings are announced. Basak and Yan (2005) show, within a dynamic asset pricing model, that even though the utility cost of money illusion (and hence the incentive to monitor real values) is small, its e¤ect on equilibrium asset prices can be substantial. In the same spirit, Fehr and Tyran (2001) show that (under strategic complementarity) even if only a small fraction of individuals su¤er from money illusion, the aggregate e¤ect can be large.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the …rst to empirically assess the link between money illusion and housing prices. We …nd strong support in favor of money illusion and weak supportive evidence for the proxy e¤ect.
It should be emphasized that stock and housing markets di¤er both in their structure and their composition. While the residential housing market is dominated by individual households, institutional investors play a major role in the stock market. Further, trading frictions, most notably short-sale constraints, severely limit arbitrage in the residential housing market.
Borrowing Constraint and Speculation
Tilt E¤ect. Lessard and Modigliani (1975) and Tucker (1975) show that under nominal …xed payment and …xed interest rate mortgages, in ‡ation shifts the real burden of mortgage payments towards the earlier years of the …nancing contract. In the presence of borrowing constraints, this limits the size of the mortgages agents can obtain. This tilt e¤ect could lead to a reduction in housing demand. Kearl (1979) and Follain (1982) …nd an empirical link between in ‡ation and housing prices and argue that liquidity constraints could rationalize their …nding. Wheaton (1985) questions this simple argument in a life-cycle model and shows that several restrictive assumptions are needed for this to be the case.
Speculative Trading and Short-Sale Constraints. In the presence of money illusion and short-sale constraints, the potential disagreement between rational and irrational agents can also lead to housing frenzies. Piazzesi and Schneider (2007) show in a static setting that house prices are highest whenever the disagreement about the in ‡ation level is high.
8 Harrison and Kreps (1978) show in a dynamic setting that speculative behavior can arise if agents have di¤erent opinions (i.e., non-common priors). Said di¤erently, even if they could share all the available information, they would still disagree about the likelihood of outcomes. Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) put this model in a continuous-time setting and show that transaction costs dampen the amount of speculative trading, but only have limited impact on the size of the bubble. Models of this type rely on the presence of short-sale constraints -which is a natural constraint in the housing market -to preempt the ability of rational agents to correct the mispricing. Other factors that limit arbitrage include noise-trader risk [DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990) ] and synchronization risk [Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003) ].
Note also that collateral and downpayment constraints -as analyzed in Stein (1995) , Bernanke and Gertler (1989) , Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1996) , Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) , Ortalo-Magné and Rady (2006) -combined with money illusion would lead to an ampli…cation of the negative e¤ect of in ‡ation on housing prices.
Housing Prices and In ‡ation
We focus on the link between in ‡ation and the price-rent ratio. In principle, an agent could either buy or rent a house to receive the same service ‡ow. However, renting and buying a house are not perfect substitutes since households might derive extra utility from owning a house (e.g., ability to customize the interior, pride of ownership). Moreover, properties for rent might on average be di¤erent from properties for sale. Nevertheless, long-run movement in the rent level should capture long-run movements in the service ‡ow. Furthermore, changes in construction cost, demographic changes, and changes in housing quality should at least in the long-run a¤ect housing prices and rent symmetrically. As a consequence, in studying mispricing in the housing market, we focus on the price-rent ratio. Gallin (2004) …nds that housing prices and rents are cointegrated and that the price-rent ratio is a good predictor of future price and rent changes. Compared to the price-income ratio, the price-rent ratio has the advantage of being less likely to increase dramatically due to changes in fundamentals (e.g., in demography or property taxes). Moreover, Gallin (2003) empirically rejects the hypothesis of cointegration between prices and income using panel-data tests for cointegration, which have been shown to be more powerful than the time-series analog.
This implies that the commonly used error correction representation of prices and income would lead to erroneous frequentist inference. Finally, studying the price-rent ratio is also analogous to the commonly used price-dividend ratio approach to analyze the mispricing in the stock market.
In this section, we show …rst that a simple non-linear function of the nominal interest rate is a proxy for the valuation of the price-rent ratio by an agent prone to money illusion. Empirically, we …rst document the correlation between nominal variables and future price-rent ratios. To gain further understanding of this empirical link, we then decompose the price-rent ratio into a rational component and an implied mispricing and study its comovements with in ‡ation. In this section, we conduct our empirical analysis focusing on U.K. data because the longer sample period (1966:Q2-2004:Q4) and the better quality of the data allow us to obtain sharper and more robust inference.
Housing Prices and Money Illusion -A First-Cut
In a dynamic optimization setting, the equilibrium real price an agent is willing to pay for the house, P t , should be equal to the present discounted value of future real rents, fL t g, and the discounted resale value of the house.
where m t; is the stochastic discount factor between t and > t, T is the time of resale, andẼ t is the expectations operator given agents'subjective beliefs at time t.
In order to present a …rst insight into the role of in ‡ation bias, we start by considering a simple setting without uncertainty and with constant real rent, as in Modigliani and Cohn (1979) . In this case, as T ! 1, the equilibrium price-rent ratio for an economy with rational agents is:
where r t;t+ is the real (quarterly) risk-free yield from t to , r t is the real risk-free rate, and we assume that lim T !1 1 1+r t;T T P T = 0. Equation (1) holds exactly if the real risk-free rate, r t , is constant. 10 10 Note that strictly speaking L t re ‡ects all payo¤s from owning a house. This includes not only the service ‡ow from living in the house but also tax bene…ts, property tax, etc. For our empirical analysis, we focus only on the main component: the market price of the service from living in the house. The standard user cost approach in real estate economics takes the other components into account as well. The user cost is stated in terms of per dollar of house value. More speci…cally, Instead, if the agent su¤ers from money illusion, the agent treats the (constant) nominal risk-free yield, i, as real. This implies the in ‡ation biased evaluation:
where the …rst approximation ignores the Jensen's inequality term and the second approximation is exact if the nominal interest rate, i t , is constant. 11 This derivation parallels the one in Modigliani and Cohn (1979) for the stock market. Equations (1) and (2) suggest that 1=i t , 1=r t and in ‡ation t should be used as alternative regressors to test for money illusion. It is also worth emphasizing that 1=i t is highly non-linear in i t for low i t -a fact independently emphasized for the real interest rate by Himmelberg, Mayer, and Sinai (2005) .
To take a …rst look at the empirical link between in ‡ation, nominal interest rates and the price-rent ratio, we explore whether i t , r t , t , 1=i t , and 1=r t have forecasting power for the price-rent ratio. In assessing the forecasting performance of these variables, one faces several econometric issues. First, Ferson, Sarkissian, and Simin (2002) use a simulation exercise to argue that the in-sample regression results may be spurious, and both the R 2 and statistical signi…cance of the regressor are biased upward if both the expected part of the regressand and the predictive variable are highly persistent [see also Torous, Valkanov, and Yan (2005) ]. Therefore, since P t =L t is highly persistent, this could lead to spurious results. Second, in exploring the forecastability of the price-rent ratio, the choice of the control variables is problematic and to some extent arbitrary since the literature on housing prices has suggested numerous predictors. Moreover, Poterba (1991) outlines that the relation between housing prices and forecasting variables often used in the literature has not been stable across sub-samples.
We address both issues jointly. For the …rst problem, we remove the persistent component of the price-rent ratio by constructing the following forecasting errorŝ
, where r f t is the risk-free real interest rate, ! t the property tax per dollar house value, the third term captures the fact that nominal interest payments and property taxes are deductible from the income tax with marginal tax rate , t re ‡ects maintenance costs, and g t+1 is the capital gain (loss) per dollar of house value, t is the risk premium. Note that since nominal mortgage interest payments are income tax deductible, in ‡ation lowers user cost and, since the price-rent ratio should be equal to the reciprocal of the user cost, this suggests higher house prices [see Poterba (1984 Poterba ( , 1991 ]. This is exactly the opposite in ‡ation e¤ect of the one caused by money illusion. A major drawback of the user cost approach is that the house price appreciation is assumed to be exogenous and is not derived from a consistent dynamic equilibrium. In particular, by assuming that the price appreciation follows historical patterns, one implicitly assume "irrational" positive feedback trading phenomena.
11 Equation (2) makes clear that money illusion matters independently of whether the mortgage contract is a ‡exible rate or a …xed rate one.
where is the forecasting horizon andÊ t [P t =L t ] is the (estimated) persistent component of the price-rent ratio and we introduce the convention that for = 0,^ t+1;t+1 = P t+1 =L t+1 . Second, we estimateÊ t [P t =L t ] by …tting a reduced form vector auto regressive model (VAR) for P t =L t , the log gross return on housing, r h;t , the rent growth rate l t and the log real return on the twenty-year government bonds, r t (constructed as the nominal rate, i t , minus quarterly in ‡ation).
12
Following Campbell and Shiller (1988) , for small perturbations around the steady state, the variables included in the VAR should capture most of the relevant information for the price-rent ratio. Indeed, the R 2 of the VAR equation for P t =L t is about 99%, which is consistent with previous studies that have outlined the high degree of predictability of housing prices [see, among others, Kearl (1979); Follain (1982) ; Muellbauer and Murphy (1997) ]. This approach for constructing forecast errors,^ t+1;t+1 , is parsimonious since it allows us to remove persistency from the dependent variable without assuming a structural model. It is also conservative since the reduced form VAR is likely to over-…t the price-rent ratio. We use quarterly data over the sample period 1966:Q3-2004:Q4. The VAR is estimated with one lag since this is the optimal lag length suggested by both the Bayesian and Akaike information criteria. Figure 3 summarizes the results about the predictability of the price-rent ratio. The …gure plots Newey and West (1987) corrected t-statistics (Panel A) and measures of …t (Panel B) of …ve univariate regressions of^ t+1;t+1 on r t , i t ; 1=r t , 1=i t and a smoothed moving average of in ‡ation, t .
13 (Recall that we introduced the convention that for = 0,^ t+1;t+1 = P t+1 =L t+1 .) That is, the …rst point in each of the plotted series corresponds to the regression output of a standard forecasting regression for the price-rent ratio.
Focusing …rst on = 0 -the standard forecasting regression -it is apparent that the real interest rate, r, has no forecasting power for the price-rent ratio with a t-statistic (Panel A) of 0:741 and a R 2 (Panel B) of about 0%. This is consistent with the …nding of Muellbauer and Murphy (1997) that the real interest rate has no explanatory power for movements in the real price of residential housing. The sign of the slope coe¢ cient of the nominal interest rate, i, is negative suggesting that an increase in the nominal interest rate reduces the price-rent ratio. The regressor is statistically signi…cant only at the 10% level and explains about 5% of the variation in the price-rent ratio. The 12 Note that one could alternatively remove the persistent component of the regressors. But doing this, would add an additional layer of uncertainty since our ability of removing the persistent component might change from regressor to regressor. Furthermore, this alternative approach would put too much emphasis on the last innovation of the regressor.
Also note that we reject that the price-rent ratio is non-stationary, consistent with …ndings in Gallin (2004) . As a consequence, we cannot model P t =L t as cointegrated with any of the regressors considered.
13 Note that the measure of in ‡ation we use is the CPI index without housing. The smoothing window is of sixteen quarters and we take 0:9 as the smoothing parameter. …gure also shows that lagged in ‡ation is a signi…cant predictor of the price-rent ratio and that the estimated slope coe¢ cient has a negative sign, which is consistent with the Modigliani and Cohn (1979) argument that in ‡ation causes a negative mispricing in assets. This is also consistent with the …ndings of Kearl (1979) and Follain (1982) that housing demand is reduced by greater in ‡ation. The regressor explains about 7% of the time variation in P t =L t . From the predictive regression of the price-rent ratio on 1=r t -as suggested by Equation (1) -we learn that this variable is not signi…cant nor has any forecasting power for the future price-rent ratio, reinforcing the conjecture that housing prices do not tend to respond to changes in the real interest rate. However, the reciprocal of the nominal interest rate, 1=i t , is highly statistically signi…cant and has a positive sign implying that the price-rent ratio tends to comove with the valuation of agents prone to money illusion. Moreover, this regressor is able to explain about 9% of the time variation in the price-rent ratio. Consistently with money illusion, in ‡ation t shows a signi…cant negative correlation with housing prices.
Focusing on > 0, we can assess whether the regressors considered have forecasting power for the unexpected component of price-rent changes.
14 It is clear from Figure 3 that the real interest rate (both in terms of r and 1=r) generally has no explanatory power for the unexpected movements in the price-rent ratio. To the contrary, the nominal interest rate, in ‡ation, and the reciprocal of the nominal interest rate are statistically signi…cant forecasting variables of unexpected movements in the price-rent ratio, and explain a substantial share of the time series variation of this variable.
For robustness we check our results using the real interest rate implied by the yields on in ‡ation protected ten-year government bonds, instead of using nominal interest rate minus in ‡ation, and using the implied in ‡ation instead of our smoothed in ‡ation. Unfortunately, this data is available only since 1982:Q1. Consistently with the previous results, we …nd that this measure of the real interest rate also has no explanatory power for the price-rent ratio: the regressor is not statistically signi…cant for any horizon and its point estimate changes sign at some horizons. Moreover, using implied in ‡a-tion instead of smoothed in ‡ation we obtain similar patterns as in Figure 3 . The only di¤erence is that implied in ‡ation is not statistically signi…cant at two horizon levels, = 1 and 2; this is likely to be due to the fact that we lose sixteen years of quarterly data using implied in ‡ation. Similarly, the real yield spread does not seem to matter. We de…ne the real yield spread as the ten-year real interest rate from in ‡ation protected government bonds minus the three-month government bills reduced by current in ‡ation. Moreover, estimated real interest rate variability and in ‡ation variability are generally not signi…cant predictors of the price-rent ratio, but nevertheless add (very little) explanatory power when considered jointly with in ‡ation. The nominal yield spread seems to matter, but this might be spurious since its predictive power goes away when we control for the persistent component of the price-rent ratio. Finally, the default spread, de…ned as the di¤erence in yield between the Great Britain Corporate Bond Yield and the ten-year government bond, has predictive power. 15 Nevertheless, the default spread does not substantially reduce the statistical signi…cance of our main nominal regressors ( t , 1=i t , and i t ). Case and Shiller (1989, 1990) …nd that housing price changes are predictable and argue that this might be at odds with market e¢ ciency. To check whether this potential departure from market e¢ ciency is connected with money illusion, we test whether lagged in ‡ation and the reciprocals of the nominal and real interest rates help to predict the …rst di¤erence of the price-rent ratio. We …nd that (i) lagged in ‡ation and nominal interest rates explain 6% to 10% of the time series variation of the changes in the price-rent ratio, (ii) these regressors are statistically signi…cant at levels between 1% and 5%, (iii) the estimated signs are consistent with money illusion, and (iv) the real interest rate does not have any predictive power for changes in the price-rent ratio.
Of course, our results only show that the implicit stochastic discount factor is related to in ‡ation. That is, the forecastability of the price-rent ratio could also be due to predictable changes in the required risk-premium. This would be rational, hence it does not need to be caused by money illusion. We disentangle the role of money illusion in the next subsection.
Decomposing the In ‡ation E¤ect
In ‡ation can a¤ect the price-rent ratio for various reasons. In this subsection, we di¤erentiate the rational e¤ects of in ‡ation on the price-rent ratio -through expected future rent growth rates and expected future returns on housing -from the irrational, mispricing e¤ect of in ‡ation.
Methodology
We follow the Campbell and Shiller (1988) methodology, but allow agents to have a subjective probability measure, potentially di¤erent from the rational probability measure.
Let P and L respectively be the observed (possibly distorted) price and rental payment of housing. The gross return on housing, R h , is given by the following accounting identity:
Under the assumption that the price-rent ratio is stationary, we can log-linearize the last equation around the steady state to get:
where r h;t := log R h;t , p t := log P t , l t := log L t , l t := l t l t 1 , := 1= 1 + exp(l p) , l p is the long-run average rent-price ratio (such that 0 < < 1), and k is a constant. Rearranging the above equation and iterating forward, the log price-rent ratio can be written (disregarding a constant term) as a linear combination of future rent growth, future returns on housing, and a terminal value, i.e.,
Moving to excess rent growth rates, l e t+ = l t r t , and excess returns (risk premia) on housing, r e h;t = r h;t r t , where r t is the real return on the long-term government bond (with maturity of 10 or 20 years) and letting T go to in…nity, the price-rent ratio can be expressed as:
This equality between the observed log price-rent ratio, p t l t , and future excess rent growth rate, l e t+ , and risk premia, r e h;t+ , holds for any realization of l e t+ r e h;t+ 1
=1
; p 1 l 1 , and hence holds in expectation for any probability measure.
-Mispricing Measure. Taking expectations of the observed log price-rent ratio in Equation (5) and assuming that the transversality conditions hold, yields:
where E t is the objective expectation operator conditional on the information available at time t andẼ t denotes investors'subjective (and potentially distorted) expectations conditional on the same information set. These equalities hold because both rational and irrational investors (ignoring …nancial frictions) are indi¤erent to marginal changes to their investment, since the current price-rent ratio is equal to their expected future rent-growth and risk-premia. In particular, investors who require a high risk-premium, E t r e h;t+ , also expect a high expected future rent growth rate,Ẽ t l e t+ , and so support the observed price-rent ratio.
Note that if there are irrational investors, the observed price-rent ratio p t l t can potentially deviate from the true "fundamental value."In this case, the realized excess returns r e h;t+ and rational investors' equilibrium holdings (and potentially the rent growth rate) are distorted, and hence the required risk premium E t r e h;t+ changes. It is this change in the equilibrium risk premia guarantees that Equations (6) and (7) hold at the observed price level.
Note that irrational investors perceive the risk-premium to beẼ t r e h;t+ , while their actual risk-premium is only E t r e h;t+ . Adding and subtracting
from the second equation yields:
t r e h;t+
where the last term, t , can equivalently be written as:
We use the convention
. If subjective and objective expectations were to coincide, t would be zero. Within the money illusion hypothesis, we identify t as a mispricing component. In order to see how this de…nition of mispricing can capture money illusion, let's consider the following example. As in Modigliani and Cohn (1979) , individuals fail to distinguish between nominal and real rates of returns. They mistakenly attribute a decrease (increase) in in ‡ation t to a decrease (increase) in real returns, r h;t -or equivalently ignore that a decrease in in ‡ation also lowers nominal rent growth rate ( l t + t ), i.e.,
. Therefore, our mispricing measure reduces to:
That is, the mispricing and hence the price-rent ratio are increasing as expected in ‡a-tion declines. Note that in this particular case money illusion always causes a negative mispricing error. However, if individuals have a reference level of in ‡ation, say , this is not necessarily true. In this case, the last equation becomes:
Even though the level of mispricing is di¤erent with a reference level of in ‡ation, its correlation with in ‡ation is unchanged. In order to make the theoretical decomposition operational for an empirical analysis, we will model rational expectations through a Vector Autoregression (VAR) approach and subjective expectation of the risk premia via a linear factor representation.
First, to construct the empirical counterpart of t , we follow Campbell (1991) and compute the objective expectations of rent growth rates using a reduced form VAR. The variables included in the VAR are the log excess return on housing, r e h;t , the log price-rent ratio, p t l t , the excess rent growth rate, l e t , and the exponentially smoothed moving average of in ‡ation, t . The VAR is estimated using quarterly data and the chosen lag length is one (both the Bayesian and the Akaike information criteria prefer this lag length for the estimated model). Using Equation (6), we obtain the empirical counterpart of
by subtracting estimated expected rent growth terms from the log price-rent ratio.
Second, to construct the empirical counterpart of t , we need a proxy for the unobserved termẼ t r e h;t+ . We follow Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004) 
We use di¤erent potential risk factors. As suggested in Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004) , we use as a …rst risk proxy the conditional volatility of an investment that is long on housing market and short on the ten-year government bonds. That is, we construct^ t as the OLS residual of the following linear regression:
where the …rst term is constructed as
withÊ t r e t+ being the -steps ahead VAR forecasts conditional on the data observed up to time t. The regressorsĥ t include seven lagged GARCH-estimates of the conditional volatility 16 and a lagged VAR forecast of the left-hand side variable. The latter acts as a control in an attempt to remove t from the residual^ t . By doing so, we take a conservative approach in order not to overestimate the mispricing. We also report results using only seven lagged GARCH-estimates of the conditional volatility. We denote this alternative construction of the mispricing by^ 0 t . Note that if a house is never sold, the owner is not exposed to any housing market risk except a potential reduction in borrowing capacity. The risk comes about when someone has to buy or sell a house. This is, for example, the case when an individual has to move between areas with di¤erent house price levels. Hence, an interaction between the probability of moving and cross-regional variability of house prices is a natural candidate for a risk factor. We therefore introduce a proxy for this source of risk among the risk factors t . This is done by adding three additional regressors in Equation (13): the cross-regional price variability across the fourteen main macro regions of the U.K., the total within country migration normalized by total population, and the interaction between these two variables. We denote the corresponding mispricing measure by^ 00 t . Finally, we also experimented with the canonical Fama-French risk factors.
Some note of caution is appropriate about this decomposition. First, the measure of mispricing t can depend crucially on the chosen subjective risk factor t -which is arbitrary. Second, for the OLS construction in Equation (13) to be correct, t should be orthogonal to t . Third, in deriving our -mispricing, we also assume that irrational investors understand the iterated accounting identity in Equation (4).
"-Mispricing Measure. To derive the -mispricing, we assumed that the transversality condition holds under both the objective and the subjective measure. We now relax this assumption and allow for explosive paths. Moreover, we avoid having to specify exogenous risk factors, , to identify the implied mispricing due to explosive paths.
We de…ne a new measure of mispricing, " t , that under the null hypothesis of rational pricing should be zero or at least orthogonal to proxies for money illusion. This mispricing captures the di¤erence in expectations about future excess rent growth rates and housing investment risk premia plusẼ t lim T !1 T (p t+T l t+T ) :
That is, " t is the di¤erence between observed log price-rent ratio and the log pricerent ratio that would prevail if (i) all agents were computing expectations under the objective measure and (ii) the transversality condition under the objective measure holds, i.e., E t lim T !1 T (p t+T l t+T ) = 0. The "-mispricing can be expressed as a violation of the transversality condition under the objective measure:
To see this, take subjective expectation of Equation (5) and subtract the above equation from it. Therefore, the "-mispricing captures bubbles that are due to potentially exploding paths, including the intrinsic bubbles analyzed in Froot and Obstfeld (1991) . The price patterns depicted in Figure 1 make it di¢ cult to rule out a priori explosive paths over certain subsamples. That is, imposing the objective transversality condition might be too strong an assumption. An explosive path might occur if, for example, agents fail to understand that all the future realizations of returns and rent growth rates must map into the current price-rent ratio as Equation (4) implies. Note that we assume that all traders have the same subjective measure. If traders have heterogeneous measures and face short-sale constraints [as, for example, in Harrison and Kreps (1978) ], " t could also be a¤ected by a speculative component. To see how the "-mispricing relates to money illusion consider, as we did for the -mispricing, the Modigliani and Cohn (1979) benchmark. In this case, we obtain the same result as in Equation (10) and (11) with t replaced by " t . That is, money illusion implies a negative correlation between the "-mispricing and t , i t , and log (1=i t ).
To estimate this mispricing, we decompose the observed log price-rent ratio into three components: the implied pricing error," t , the discounted expected future rent growth, and the discounted expected future returns as follows:
whereÊ t denotes conditional expectations computed using the estimated VAR described above; that is,Ê t l e t+
are the -step ahead VAR forecasts conditional on the data observed up to time t.
We identify" under the null that it should be simply a stationary approximation error. If the null is violated, the "-mispricing could theoretically follow a martingale process (e.g., in the presence of rational bubbles). To take this possibility into account in the empirical sections below, we do two things. First, in the regression analysis presented in Section 3.2.2, we consider both" and its …rst di¤erence as dependent variable. Second, since the potential presence of non-stationary behavior in either the " mispricing and/or the variables included in our VAR speci…cation could lead to complications in the empirical analysis, in Section 3.2.3 we use a Bayesian approach that is immune from stationarity issues.
In summary, we study the following four mispricing measures. These are three di¤erent construction of the -mispricing, where the di¤erence arise due to the di¤erent sets of risk factors and control variables used for its construction, and the "-mispricing that does not require the speci…cation of subjective risk factors.
Empirical Evidence
In this subsection, we focus on the empirical links between mispricing measures and in ‡ation. Our …rst-cut analysis in Section 3.1 showed that nominal terms covary with price-rent ratio rather than real terms. But this link might be due to rational channels, frictions or money illusion. There are several rational channels through which in ‡ation could a¤ect housing prices. First, if in ‡ation damages the real economy,
should be negatively related with in ‡ation. For example, this could be the case of stag ‡ation caused by a cost-push shock. Second, P 1
=1
1 E t [r h;t+ ] could tend to rise if in ‡ation makes the economy riskier (or investors more risk averse), therefore driving up the required excess return on housing investment. If any of these were the case, the negative correlation between the price-rent ratio and in ‡ation could simply be the outcome of negative real e¤ects of in ‡ation or of time varying-risk premia on the housing investment.
Most importantly, if there were no in ‡ation illusion, we would expect our mispricing measures to be uncorrelated with t , log (1=i t ), and i t . Instead, the Modigliani and Cohn (1979) hypothesis of money illusion would predict a negative correlation between our mispricing measures and in ‡ation (and the nominal interest rate), and a positive correlation between the mispricing and log (1=i t ).
In Table 1 , Panel A reports the regression output of the three components of the log price-rent ratio in Equation (8), on the exponentially smoothed moving average of in ‡ation, t , the nominal interest rate, i t , and the log of its reciprocal, log (1=i t ). :52 The …rst row of Panel A in Table 1 reports the univariate regression output of regressing the pricing errors on the proxies that are meant to capture in ‡ation illusion. All the regressors are highly statistically signi…cant and the estimated signs are those we would expect under money illusion: the mispricing of the price-rent ratio tends to rise as in ‡ation and nominal interest rates decrease and log (1=i t ) rises. Moreover, our proxies for in ‡ation bias are able to explain between 69% and 83% of the time series variation of the mispricing of the price-rent ratio. Fitted values computed using in ‡ation are plotted versus the observed values of^ t in Figure 2 in the introduction. The …gure makes clear that the high explanatory power of in ‡ation is not due to a particular subsample.
Ideally, we would like to regress^ t on the objective expectation of future in ‡ation. One way to capture variations in expected in ‡ation is to use the series of implied in ‡ation from the in ‡ation protected ten-year government bonds. Using this measure as explanator of^ t we obtain an R 2 of 51% and a point estimate for the slope coe¢ cient of 5:06 with a t-statistics of 4:864.
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The second row of Panel A in Table 1 shows that expected future real rent growth rates seem to be negatively correlated with in ‡ation and nominal interest rate (this last variable is signi…cant only at the 10% level), and positively correlated with log (1=i t ). Nevertheless, only a small share (between 9% and 12%) of the time variation in expected rent growth is explained by the regressors considered. These results are consistent with 17 Note that in this case, due to data availability problems, we use a sample starting in 1982:Q1. a view in which in ‡ation in ‡uences the price-rent ratio partially due to the fact that high in ‡ation seems to proxy for a worsening of future economic conditions [e.g., Fama (1981) ]. On the other hand, this could simply be the outcome of housing rents being more sticky than the general price level.
The third row of Panel A in Table 1 outlines that there is no signi…cant link between in ‡ation and (subjectively expected) risk premia on the housing investment. The regressors considered are not statistically signi…cant and explain only between 2% and 4% of the time series variation in expected future returns on housing. Moreover, the estimated signs of the regressors imply that in ‡ation is associated with a lower risk premium on housing investment ( i.e., in times of high in ‡ation the housing investment is considered to be relatively less risky than investing in long-horizon government bonds). Since we use a before-tax measure of returns on housing, this result could also be due to the fact that an increase in in ‡ation increases the after-tax return on housing [see Poterba (1984) ], therefore requiring a lower before-tax risk premium.
The sum of the slope coe¢ cients associated with each of the regressors in Table  1 Panel A is an estimate of the elasticity of the price-rent ratio with respect to that regressor. Our results therefore imply that, on average, a 1% increase in in ‡ation (nominal interest rate) maps into a 4:75% (7:16%) decrease in the price of housing relative to rent, and that the largest contribution to this negative elasticity is given by the e¤ect of in ‡ation (nominal interest rate) on the mispricing Panel B of Table 1 reports the regression coe¢ cients for alternative measures of mispricings. Recall that: 0 t is the mispricing constructed without adding controls in Equation (13) 18 ; 00 t is the mispricing constructed adding our "moving risk factors"; and that " t is the mispricing constructed without specifying exogenous risk factors and measures the mispricing that maps into a violation of the transversality condition under the objective measure. Note that due to data limitations, the The …rst thing of interest is to compare the sizes of the mispricing of and 0 . Figure 4 plots the price-rent ratio, and both -mispricing measures over our sample period.
First, notice that the measures of mispricing in Figure 4 generally have the right pattern of correlation with the price-rent ratio. Second, the -mispricing and "-mispricing capture a non-negligible fraction of the variation in the price-rent ratio. Third, as argued in the methodological section, the 0 -mispricing measure seems to attribute too large a fraction of the movements in the price-rent ratio to the mispricing. The 00 -mispricing measure (not depicted), available over the shorter sample 1975:Q1-2004:Q4, closely tracks the and "-mispricings.
Next, we analyze the explanatory power of the in ‡ation illusion proxies for the 0 - 18 We also tried as alternative risk factors the canonical Fama-French risk factors and obtained similar results as for the covariance of^ Table 1 shows that botĥ 0 t and^ 00 t -as in ‡ation illusion would imply -covaries negatively (and signi…cantly) with in ‡ation t . Similarly, the univariate regressions with nominal interest rate i t and log (1=i t ) also deliver signi…cant results consistent with money illusion. Overall, the explanatory power of the in ‡ation illusion proxies is reduced for the 0 -mispricing. This is not surprising since^ 0 t in Figure 4 seems to overstate the time-variation of the mispricing. There is also a small reduction in the measure for the 00 -mispricing (second row of Panel B), but this might be partially due to the di¤erent sample period.
The third row of Panel B of Table 1 reports the regression coe¢ cient of the "-mispricing on proxies of money illusion. Once again, the signs are consistent with money illusion. Moreover, the estimated elasticities are fairly close to the ones obtained using^ t . Note that theoretically the "-mispricing could follow a martingale process (e.g., if the price process contains a rational bubble component). Hence, for robustness we also regress the …rst di¤erence of " on in ‡ation. The estimated regression coe¢ cient is 4:02 with a t-statistic of 7:459 and an R 2 of 31%. One worry might be that credit standards might vary over time in response to overall economic conditions, and that this mechanism might generate the link between mispricing and in ‡ation we …nd in the data. This is potentially important since we have already observed in Section 3.1 that there is a statistically signi…cant link between price-rent movements and the default spread (which is meant to capture the overall economic condition of the credit market). To assess the relevance of the time-variation of credit market conditions, we regress our mispricing measures on in ‡ation and the default spread jointly. We …nd that, for all the measures of mispricing, default spread is not statistically signi…cant after controlling for in ‡ation and that the measures of …t do not increase by more than 1%.
Next, the mispricing might be linked to the volatility of in ‡ation more than the level itself. We check this hypothesis by running multivariate regressions of our mispricing measures on in ‡ation and an estimate of conditional in ‡ation volatility. 19 We …nd that the conditional volatility of in ‡ation has no explanatory power for both mispricing measures after controlling for the level of in ‡ation.
Overall, the results in Table 1 suggest that money illusion can explain a large share of the mispricing in the housing market and that the negative correlation between in ‡ation and the rent-price ratio is mainly due to the e¤ect of money illusion on the mispricing. Nevertheless, our …ndings could be rationalized by some forms of market frictions. Section 4 addresses this alternative hypotheses formally.
Robustness Analysis
Assessing Uncertainty. To assess the robustness of these results, we next consider the uncertainty due to the fact that we do not directly observe expected rent growth rates and expected future returns on housing, but instead we use the estimated VAR to construct their proxies.
Under a di¤use prior, the posterior distribution of the estimated VAR can be factorized as the product of an inverse Wishart and, conditional on the covariance matrix, a multivariate normal distribution as follows:
where is the vector of slope coe¢ cients in the VAR system, is the covariance matrix of the residuals, the variables with a hat denote the corresponding estimates, X is the matrix of regressors, n is the sample size and m is the number of estimated parameters per equation [see Zellner (1971); Schervish (1995) ; Bauwens, Lubrano, and Richard (1999) ]. This result is exact under normality and the Je¤reys'prior f ( ; ) / j j
(where p is the number of left-hand side variables), but can also be obtained, under mild regularity conditions, as an asymptotic approximation around the posterior MLE. The Je¤reys'prior formulates the idea of "lack of prejudice" on the space of distribution for the data, and is also ‡at over the space of the s and remains ‡at under reparameterization.
The use of this Bayesian approach allows us to draw inference that is robust to the potential presence of non-stationary behavior in both the variables included in our VAR and of our measures of mispricing. The reason being that the likelihood will have an asymptotically Gaussian shape even in the presence of unit roots (Kim (1994) ). To summarize the shape of the posterior distribution of the parameters of interest, we compute 10,000 draws from the posterior distribution of the VAR coe¢ cients and, for each draw, we construct expected excess returns, expected rent growth rates and implied mispricing, and use this variables to repeat the regressions reported in the previous section (the procedure is described in detail in Appendix A.2). Table 2 Each row of Table 2 reports the median slope coe¢ cient associated with the regressor, the median R 2 , and (in squared brackets) their 95% con…dence intervals. The …rst row of Panel A of Table 2 shows that the relation between in ‡ation illusion and the mispricing of the rent-price ratio is a robust one: in ‡ation and nominal interest rate show a signi…cantly negative correlation with the mispricing, while the in ‡ation-biased valuation shows a signi…cantly positive correlation. Moreover, even though the distribution of the estimated R 2 has a heavy left-tail, there seems to be a very high posterior probability that these variables explain a large share of the time series variation in the mispricing. The second and third rows of Panel A of Table 2 show instead that there is substantial uncertainty about the correlation between in ‡ation, nominal interest rate and expected future returns on housing and expected future rent growth rates. Overall, these results con…rm an empirically strong link between nominal values and the mispricing of the housing market, and suggest that this mechanism is the main source of the negative correlation between the price-rent ratio and in ‡ation and the nominal interest rate.
Note that these results are conditional on the estimated risk factor t . The reason being that the uncertainty about t hinges more upon what the risk factor should be than upon how it is estimated. To address this we perform a similar robustness exercise using the "-mispricing -that does not depend on exogenous risk factors. These results are reported in Panel B of Table 2 and -as in Panel A -are very similar to the ones in Table 1 .
Assessing the Role of the Business Cycle. Unlike the price-dividend ratio in the stock market, the observed price-rent ratio is a less precise measure since the housing price index re ‡ects all types of dwellings, while the rent index tends to overweight smaller and lower quality dwellings.
The prices of high-quality houses appreciate at a higher rate during booms, and depreciate more during recessions, than cheaper houses do [see, among others, Poterba (1991) and Earley (1996) ]. This might cause the measured price-rent ratio to comove with the business cycle. Hence, if in ‡ation and the nominal interest rate had a clear business cycle pattern, our estimated mispricing measures could show a spurious correlation with these variables. Figure 8 in Appendix A.3 plots the time series of the U.K. exponentially smoothed quarterly in ‡ation, the return on the twenty-year government bonds, and the Hodrick and Prescott (1997) …ltered estimate of the GDP business cycle. The …gure shows that there is no strong contemporaneous correlation of in ‡ation and nominal interest rates with the business cycle (the correlation coe¢ cients are :16 and :15; respectively). This suggests that the high degree of explanatory power that in ‡ation and the nominal interest rate have for the housing market mispricing is unlikely to be due to the comovement of these variables with the business cycle. In Appendix A.3 we address this issue formally, and we …nd that the inclusion of the business cycle in the OLS regressions for the mispricing measures (i) does not drive out the statistical signi…cance of t , i t and log (1=i t ), (ii) does not signi…cantly change the point estimates of the elasticities of the mispricing reported in Table 1 , (iii) does not signi…cantly increase our ability to explain the time variation in the mispricing, and (iv) that the business cycle alone has very little (in the case of^ t and" t ) or no (in the case of^
Tilt E¤ect
Our empirical results are consistent with money illusion. Nevertheless, we could be capturing the tilt e¤ect of in ‡ation, which potentially generates a negative relationship between in ‡ation and housing prices. The tilt e¤ect refers to a particular form of liquidity constraint. It is best understood by comparing the real repayment pro…les of a mortgage with and without in ‡ation. Suppose agents can only enter …xed nominal repayment mortgages. The real repayment pro…les of such a contract are depicted in Figure 5 for a zero and a positive in ‡ation environment. Without in ‡ation the real mortgage payments are constant, while in an in ‡ationary environment the real mortgage payments decrease over time. In order to keep the real net present value the same in the two environments, the initial payments have to be higher in a world with non-zero in ‡ation. That is, the real repayment pro…le is tilted towards the earlier periods. In other words, when in ‡ation is high, the …nancial burden is "front-loaded"and the mortgage-payment-to-income-ratio is higher in the early years of the mortgage. Hence, liquidity constraints are more likely to bind and agents are less able to leverage. In turn, a more binding constraint in the …rst period of the mortgage depresses housing demand and prices. Note that if liquidity constraint were to be binding for a large set of agents, we would expect the price-rent ratio, and the mispricing measures, to be linked to movements in the real interest rate -we have seen in previous sections that this is not the case.
To test whether the tilt e¤ect drives our results we perform two types of tests. First, note that the intercept of the repayment scheme is proportional to the nominal interest rate, i, and that it is related to in ‡ation only insofar as it a¤ects the nominal interest rate. That is, once one controls for the nominal interest rate, in ‡ation should not matter if the tilt e¤ect is the driving force of our results. On the other hand, if the mispricing is driven by money illusion, it should be related to in ‡ation as stressed in Equation (10).
20 Therefore, we regress our benchmark mispricing measures, t and ", jointly on in ‡ation and the nominal interest rate (both in levels and in logs). If the mispricing is driven by the tilt e¤ect, in ‡ation should not play any role after controlling for the nominal interest rate i. This hypothesis is clearly rejected as shown in Table 3 .
DepVar:
Regressors: The …rst row of Table 3 reports the multivariate regression of the -mispricing on in ‡ation and the nominal interest rate. The inclusion of the interest rate does not drive out the statistical signi…cance of and it increases the measure of …t by a mere 2% (see Table 1 ). Note also that in ‡ation is highly statistically signi…cant, while the interest rate is only signi…cant at the 5% level. The second row uses log (i t ) instead of i t and delivers almost identical results. The third and the fourth row use the "-mispricing. In both cases in ‡ation is highly statistically signi…cant after controlling for the interest rate. Furthermore, both i t and log (i t ) are not statistically signi…cant and the inclusion of these regressors increase the measures of …t by no more than 1%.
These results reject the null that our key …ndings are simply capturing the tilt e¤ect. Nevertheless, they could be due to a subset of the observations in the sample. To check for this, we perform the same exercise as reported in Table 3 using a rolling window with size equal to a third of the full sample.
Panel A and Panel B of Figure 6 depict the estimated regression coe¢ cients and 95% con…dence intervals of multi-variate regression of the -mispricing on in ‡ation t and the log of the nominal interest rate, log (i t ). The second row of Figure 6 reports the same analysis for the "-mispricing. The point estimates are reported at the date of the last observation of the rolling sample (of 52 quarterly observations) -e.g., the point estimates corresponding to 1982:Q1 uses data from 1969:Q2 to 1982:Q1. In ‡ation is always signi…cant, while log (i t ) is generally not statistically signi…cant for themispricing and never signi…cant for the "-mispricing. Moreover, the weak statistical Mispricing measures psi eps pi log(i) Panel A 1980 Panel A 1982 Panel A 1984 Panel A 1986 Panel A 1988 Panel A 1990 Panel A 1992 Panel A 1994 Panel A 1996 Panel A 1998 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 Figure 6: Multivariate regression of mispricing measures on in ‡ation, , and log interest rate, log (i), over rolling samples.
signi…cance of log (i t ) in explaining the -mispricing over the whole sample (Table 3) appears to be driven by the last four years of data. This last point is con…rmed by an expanding window regression exercise (not reported here). Furthermore, the same qualitative results were obtained using the level of the nominal interest rate, i t instead of log (i t ). Second, we now present an alternative test to discriminate between the money illusion and the tilt-e¤ect hypotheses based on the evolution of the mortgage market over time. Note that in our example the tilt e¤ect arises since the nominal mortgage payments are constant, but more ‡exible mortgage contracts might reduce or eliminate it. Indeed, in the real world, agents can use multiple alternative …nancing schemes available on the market that are not a¤ected by the tilt e¤ect. For example this is the case for ‡exible interest rate mortgages, price level adjusted mortgages (PLAM) or the graduate payment mortgages (GPM).
21 This is especially true in the United Kingdom, where PLAM and GPM were available at least since the early 1970's. Furthermore, new, more ‡exible, mortgage products were introduced over the years in all major countries. In the U.S., for example, interest-only mortgages, which substantially lower the initial payments, have become very popular in recent years. 22 Hence, we would expect that the importance of the tilt e¤ect -if it is there -declines over time. That is, the negative elasticity of the mispricing to in ‡ation should become less negative over the sample period.
We empirically assess this hypothesis. Figure 7 depicts point estimates and Newey and West (1987) 95% con…dence intervals of the univariate regressions of the estimated mispricing on t , i t , and 1=i t over a time-varying sample. We use the …rst ten years of data to obtain an initial estimate of the slope coe¢ cient associated with each regressor, and we then add one data point at a time and update our estimates. For example, the point corresponding to 1992 …rst quarter is the estimated slope coe¢ cient over the sample 1966 second quarter to 1992 …rst quarter. Figure 7 Panel A, for the -mispricing, and Panel D, for the "-mispricing, reveal that the trend goes, if anything, in the opposite direction of what we would expect if the tilt e¤ect were the driving mechanism behind the empirical link between housing prices and in ‡ation. Over time, the negative relation between mispricing and in ‡ation becomes more negative. The elasticity with respect to the interest rate is essentially ‡at (Panels B and E). Only the elasticity with respect to the log of the nominal interest rate reciprocal seems to decline at the end of the sample for the -mispricing (Panel C), but this reduction is not statistically signi…cant, while it is essentially ‡at for the "-mispricing (Panel F). Overall, these …ndings suggest that it is unlikely that the tilt e¤ect is the mechanism behind the empirical link between housing mispricing and in ‡ation.
How do the …ndings in Figure 7 square with money illusion? Money illusion does not have a clear implication as to whether the elasticity of mispricing to in ‡ation should vary over time. Nevertheless, the decline in the negative slope coe¢ cient (in Panel A and D) is consistent with a setting in which households'attention to in ‡ation depends on the recent history of in ‡ation. Money illusion is very costly after and during a period of high in ‡ation. Hence, households are more attentive to in ‡ation and less prone to money illusion. In contrast, the cost of money illusion is perceived to be low after and during a period of low in ‡ation -as in the last part of our sample -and hence money illusion is more wide-spread increasing the elasticity of the mispricing to in ‡ation. 
Lock-in E¤ect
When in ‡ation and interest rates creep up, households that have secured a non-portable mortgage with a low …xed nominal interest rate in the past might be reluctant to buy a new, better quality house. This in turn could depress the demand for high-quality houses and lower the supply for low-quality houses. Therefore, given that the pools of rental houses and houses on the market for sale are not perfectly symmetric, this could be the driving force of the empirical link between the price-rent ratio and the nominal interest rate. Noticing that this "lock-in e¤ect" is asymmetric -since it predicts an additional reduction in housing demand for buying only when the interest rate is above the lockedin interest rate -we can perform a series of tests to assess this hypothesis.
First, we run a set of regressions of our mispricing measures, and ", on the interest rate and in ‡ation interacted with a dummy variable that captures upward movements in the interest rate over the last four quarters.
That is, we run the following regressions:
where t is either^ t or" t , and d t is an indicator function of upward movements in the nominal interest rate i t . The lock-in e¤ect suggests that the coe¢ cient estimatê b 1 should be di¤erent fromb 2 . However, we cannot reject thatb 1 =b 2 for both regressions and both mispricing measures. Second, using rolling samples (containing ten years of observations each) we test three separate hypotheses: Corr [R 2 t ; D t ] 6 = 0; Corr [R 2 t ; i t ] 6 = 0; and Corr R 2 t ; p t l t 6 = 0, where R 2 t is the measure of …t of the regression of on i in each rolling sample, D t is the average d t on a given subsample, and p t l t is the average log price-rent ratio in a given subsample. All theses hypotheses are rejected at standard con…dence levels.
These results may not be surprising since most mortgages are portable in the U.K.. This is unlike in the U.S. where a large share of the mortgage contracts are not portable. Nevertheless, as in the U.K., all stated hypotheses can be rejected with U.S. data also except for Corr [R 2 t ; D t ] 6 = 0.
Cross-regional Heterogeneity
In the previous section, we document money illusion as an aggregate phenomenon that can generate house price run ups without changes in economic fundamentals. In this section, we explore whether money illusion can be reconciled with the observed regional heterogeneity in price behavior within a country. In order to do this we shift our focus from the U.K. to the U.S. housing market because the cross-sectional heterogeneity is more prominent in the U.S. and more regional data is available. We …rst document money illusion in the aggregate U.S. housing market. We then document heterogeneity in housing supply elasticity at the state level and explain how money illusion and heterogeneity in supply elasticity can rationalize the heterogeneity in regional price dynamics.
Aggregate U.S. Evidence
In this section, we examine the link between housing market mispricing measures and nominal values in the U.S. following the same procedure as in Section 3.2. The sample period available runs from 1970:Q1 to 2004:Q3. Univariate regression results are reported in Table 3 . The …rst row shows that the proxies considered are all signi…cant explanatory variables for the mispricing. Moreover, the sign of the estimated elasticity is the one we would expect under in ‡ation illusion: the mispricing of the price-rent ratio tends to rise as in ‡ation and nominal interest rates decrease. The coe¢ cient estimates for the U.S. data are similar to the ones for the U.K. The measures of …t are somewhat smaller compared to the U.K. case, but this is likely to be due to the shorter sample period and poorer quality of U.S. data. An exception is the R 2 for the expected rent growth rate, which is higher for the U.S.
For a review of the measurement problems in U.S. data on housing, see McCarthy and Peach (2004) . Nevertheless, the R 2 ranges from 28% when the explanatory variable is the nominal interest rate to 45% when we use in ‡ation as the explanatory variable of the mispricing.
Dependent Variables:
Regressors: :21 The second row of Table 4 shows that there is a signi…cantly negative (positive) correlation between in ‡ation and nominal interest rate (log of the nominal interest rate reciprocal) and expected future rent excess growth rates. This could either be a consequence of a negative e¤ect of in ‡ation on the real economy or due to a higher degree of stickiness in housing rents than in the general price level. The regressors considered are able to explain between 60% to 65% of the time series variation in expected future growth rates. The last row shows that there is a no statistically signi…cant link between in ‡ation/nominal interest rate and future risk premia on housing investment. The coe¢ cients for the U.S. are slightly lower compared to the U.K. coe¢ cient, which is consistent with the di¤erent tax treatment of mortgage interest payments in both countries. Overall, these results imply a negative elasticity of the price-rent ratio to in ‡ation (nominal interest rates) of about 8:7 (5:1) and that the largest contribution to this comes from the e¤ect of in ‡ation (nominal interest rate) on mispricing. Table 5 reports the results of a Monte Carlo exercise (described in Section A.2 of the Appendix) analogous to the one presented in Section 3.2, which, as in the case of U.K. data, con…rms the soundness of the empirical link between mispricing in the housing market and in ‡ation, nominal interest rate, and the log of the nominal interest rate reciprocal. On the other hand, it shows that there is substantial uncertainty about the rational links between in ‡ation (nominal interest rate) and the price-rent ratio, even though both variables show a signi…cantly negative correlation with the risk premium on the housing investment.
DepVar:
Regressors: [ 4:84, 3:21] :01 [0, :09] 4:23 [1:12, 5:82] :04 [:01, :12] :023 [ :097, 0] :07 [0, :15] 
The U.S. Regional Housing Markets
In the previous section we documented the presence of money illusion in the aggregate U.S. housing market. Yet house price shifts often vary signi…cantly across di¤erent regions of the same country. In the U.S., the recent price increase seems to be much less pronounced in the Midwest compared to the coastal regions. In this section we investigate whether money illusion can be reconciled with these heterogeneous price dynamics. First, it should be mentioned that this regional heterogeneity is less extreme than it appears at …rst sight, once one separates property prices into land value and building value. Davis and Palumbo (2006) analyze 46 large metropolitan areas in the U.S. and …nd that the appreciation of residential land since the mid-1980s is a widespread phenomenon because the price of residential land has risen much faster than housing construction costs. The di¤erent rates of increase in land and building value could partially explain the observed cross-sectional heterogeneity in property price movements. To be more explicit, consider the following stylized example. Suppose in the low population density Midwest, 80% of the property value re ‡ects the value of the building, while in New York City the building value is say only 10% of the property value. Then the same percentage increase in land price would cause a much larger increase in property value in New York City than in the Midwest.
Second, it is often argued that regional heterogeneity of property values is due to di¤erent housing supply elasticities. This could be another reason why money illusion impacts house prices across various regions di¤erently. To understand how supply elasticity interacts with money illusion, let us consider a simple setting in which housing demand, D (P; ), is decreasing in housing price, D 1 := @D=@P < 0, and in ‡ation, D 2 := @D=@ < 0, due to money illusion. The supply of housing S (P; X) is increasing in house prices, S 1 := @S=@P > 0, and also a¤ected by cost shifters X. Applying the implicit function theorem on the market clearing condition to obtain dP=d and taking the derivative with respect to the slope of the supply function S 1 , one obtains:
Since S 1 is inversely proportional to the elasticity of supply, this last equation shows that money illusion can generate large price movements in an area characterized by a low elasticity of supply (high S 1 ). 23 Therefore, we study whether S 1 changes across regional markets. 24 To do this, we nest our work in the housing supply literature and try to estimate the elasticity of new housing starts to house price changes. The existing literature has produced a wide range of both point estimates and con ‡icting methodologies [see DiPasquale (1999) for a survey]. Previous literature has focused on the empirical link between new housing starts and the housing price level. On the other hand, Mayer and Somerville (1996) argue that housing starts are a ‡ow variable and therefore should be a function of other ‡ow variables, and focus therefore on the link between housing starts and housing price changes. Also, using a panel of U.S. quarterly state-level data over the period 1975:Q1-2005:Q4, we …nd that the OFHEO housing price indices seem to contain a unit root [as in Gallin (2003 Gallin ( , 2004 ], while this hypothesis can be rejected for the new housing starts series. As a consequence, we regress housing starts in state i, I it , on the one-year price changes P it .
Note that our main interest is not to estimate the supply elasticity itself but to assess how it varies across di¤erent regions. In particular, we explore whether the relative degree of land availability generates heterogeneity in supply elasticity. For this purpose, we focus on an interaction term between prices, P it , and population density, pd it . The previous literature has shown population density to be relevant in explaining cross-sectional housing price di¤erences since it captures the relative scarcity of land [e.g., Voith (1996) ].
Regressing new housing starts on price change, we would expect a positive coef…cient for an upward-sloping supply curve. But, if high population density reduces the elasticity of supply, adding as a regressor price changes interacted with population density, P it pd it , we would expect a negative coe¢ cient.
In order to distinguish movements along the supply curve from movements of the supply curve, we introduce as controls a set of construction-cost shifters. The additional regressors are the one-year change in the real ENR building cost index, the real interest rate on the three-month T-bill as a proxy for the cost of capital, and the one-year change in the per capita state-speci…c real wage as a proxy for labor cost changes.
In our panel regressions we also control for state …xed e¤ects and state-speci…c cyclicality using state-speci…c quarterly dummies. In addition, we add to our regressions a third-order polynomial in a linear time trend and the time series of state population densities. We also add lagged new housing starts, I it 1 , to capture the high degree of persistence of the regressand. Population density is constructed removing water area from the total state area and the series is normalized to have unit mean. Nominal values are made real using the CPI less shelter. Unfortunately, we do not have data on land prices at the state level to add as an additional control. Following the previous literature, we include in ‡ation to the regressions, and we also interact in ‡ation with population density.
Since we have quarterly data over the period 1975:Q1-2005:Q4 for 50 states plus the District of Columbia, our sample size of 5; 865 observations implies that our regressions have more than 5; 640 degrees of freedom. Since prices, construction costs, and wages are potentially endogenously determined, we need to perform IV estimates. As instruments we use all the exogenous variables and their …rst lag, all the dummies and trends, and the …rst two lags of the endogenous variables. Weak instruments do not seem to be an issue since the measures of …t of the …rst-stage regressions range between 70% for price changes to 82% for the ENR building cost index. We also employ a heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent estimator of the covariance matrix with Newey and West (1987) windows of 12 lags, and corrected to take into account the use of instrumental variables. Table 6 reports the point estimates of the main coe¢ cients of interest in our panel regression. The …rst row shows, as expected, a positive correlation between price changes and new housing starts but the regression coe¢ cient is signi…cant only at the 10% level. Most importantly, the interaction term between price changes and population density is negative and highly statistically signi…cant, suggesting that the elasticity of housing supply is reduced in areas where land is relatively scarce. In ‡ation shows a signi…cantly negative relationship with housing starts as already found in Topel and Rosen (1988) . This last …nding is consistent with the proxy e¤ect of in ‡ation but also with a setting in which rational builders are aware that households su¤er from money illusion. Indeed, Topel and Rosen (1988) …nd the e¤ect of in ‡ation on housing starts to be too strong to be explained by their rational investment model. The real interest rate is not signi…cant. The second row replaces the interaction term P it pd it with the interaction of in ‡ation and population density, t pd it . The point estimate of the other coe¢ cients is almost unchanged and price changes are statistically signi…cant only at the 10% level, while in ‡ation is highly signi…cant and the real interest rate is not. Interestingly, t pd it has a positive sign suggesting that in ‡ation tends to reduce supply less in high density areas. The last row uses both interaction terms, and con…rms the results of the previous regressions and also shows that the two interaction terms have di¤erent information content since they are both strongly signi…cant even when employed jointly.
For robustness, we also performed regressions in which we modeled parametrically autoregression in the residuals, without obtaining signi…cantly di¤erent results. Finally, we performed structural estimations of the investment model of Topel and Rosen (1988) , but adding an interaction term between prices, in ‡ation, and population density. Even though these last estimations regress housing starts on price levels, instead of price changes, we obtained qualitatively similar results.
Overall, the results in this section reconcile the presence of money illusion as an aggregate phenomenon and regional di¤erences in price behavior.
Conclusion
This paper studies the link between in ‡ation and housing prices. Our …rst-cut approach shows that the housing price-rent ratio is not a¤ected by the real interest rate, but by the nominal interest rate. Moreover, we decompose time-series movements of the price-rent ratio into movements in a rational component and an implied mispricing component. We …nd that movements in in ‡ation explain a large share of the time variation of the mispricing. These results are robust and hold for both the U.K. and the U.S. housing markets.
Two potential explanations of the link between the price-rent ratio and in ‡ation naturally arise. First, in ‡ation might make the economy riskier, or agents more risk averse, therefore increasing risk premia and driving down real estate prices. Second, current high in ‡ation might be disruptive for the economy and/or in ‡ation might proxy for future downturns, therefore depressing current housing value. We do not …nd supportive evidence for the …rst hypothesis, while the evidence in favor of the second hypothesis does not seem to be robust in the housing market context.
We also investigate possible explanations due to market frictions. First, in ‡ation may tilt real mortgage payments towards the earlier years, making funding constraints potentially more binding. Second, an increase in in ‡ation may dampen the demand for housing upgrades from individuals that have locked-in low nominal interest rates on an existing mortgages. Our extensive series of tests suggests that these market frictions are unlikely to be the mechanism behind the link between in ‡ation and housing market mispricing. We also document substantial heterogeneity in housing supply elasticity across U.S. states due to di¤erences in relative land scarcity, and we argue that this could reconcile our evidence of an aggregate money illusion phenomenon in housing markets with the observed heterogeneity in regional price behavior.
We therefore interpret our …ndings as supportive evidence for the money illusion hypothesis. Our …ndings provide a new argument in favor of price stability, since residential housing is the single largest asset class of households.
Several potential future research avenues come to mind. First, the analysis could be extended to a cross-section of countries to assess the role of institutional features. Preliminary results for Australia are also supportive of the money illusion hypothesis. Second, it would be interesting to study the common root of money illusion in markets as di¤erent as the residential housing market, the commercial real estate market and the stock and bond markets.
(obtained through the Bank of International Settlements) over the period 1970:01 to 1975:04. To construct the rent index, we use the CPI-Rent from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. We re-scale the indexes to levels to match the historical average of the U.S. price-rent ratio over the same sample [as reported in Ayuso and Restoy (2003) ]. As long-run interest rate, we use the return on the ten-year Treasury bill. As measure of in ‡ation, we use the CPI without housing.
Regional Data. As housing price index, we use the quarterly OFHEO Housing Price Index (HPI) for 50 states and the District of Columbia over the period 1975:Q1 to 2005:Q4. The availability of these data series determines the sample of the panel analysis. As new housing starts measure, we use the quarterly not seasonally adjusted state level Private Housing Units Permits Authorized series from the Markets database available through Global Insight. The labor cost measure is the state level quarterly total Wages and Salary series provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. As state population measure, we use the yearly total resident population estimates provided by the Bureau of Census of the U.S. Department of Commerce. The series are interpolated at quarterly frequency. We compute state land area as total area minus water area from the Census 2000 data. As building cost proxy we use the aggregate quarterly not seasonally-adjusted Engineering News Record (ENR) Building Cost Index (BCI) average of twenty U.S. cities. The BCI is a weighted index of skilled labor, structural steel shapes, portland cement, and lumber costs. Nominal values are made real using the CPI less shelter price index.
A.2 Assessing Uncertainty
To assess uncertainty in the regression results in Table 2 , we report 95% con…dence intervals for the estimated slope coe¢ cients and R 2 constructed via Monte Carlo integration by drawing form the posterior distribution of the estimated VAR coe¢ cients. We proceed as follows:
1. We draw covariance matrices from the inverse Wishart with parameters n^ 1 and n m.
2. Conditional on we draw a vector of coe¢ cients for the VAR, , from N ^ ; (X 0 X) 1 :
3. Using the draws of the VAR slope coe¢ cients, , we construct expected discounted sums of rent excess growth rates ( P 1
=1
1 E t l e t+ ) and obtain the excess housing returns ( P 1
1 E t r e h;t+ ) in order to compute pricing errors and ". 4. We then regress t , ", P 1 =1 1 E t l e t+ and P 1
1 t E t r e h;t+ on t , i t , and the log of the in ‡ation-biased evaluation 1=i t ; and we store the estimated slope coe¢ cients and measures of …t.
5. We repeat this procedure 10,000 times and compute con…dence intervals for the OLS slope coe¢ cients associated with t , i t and the log of 1=i t ; and for the corresponding measures of …t, from the corresponding percentiles of the Monte Carlo iterations.
A.3 Assessing the Role of the Business Cycle
To construct a business cycle proxy for the U.K. we follow Hodrick and Prescott (1997) , that is we estimated the following state-space model:
y t = g t + c t (17) g t = 2g t 1 g t 2 + v t where y t is GDP growth from quarter t 5 to quarter t, g t is the unobserved state variable meant to capture the smooth time varying trend, and c t is the cyclical component. The variance of v t is normalized to be 1=1; 600 times the variance of the cyclical component, c t , as it is customary with quarterly data. This state-space representation is estimated via Kalman …lter and Kalman smoother. Figure 8 plots the time series of the U.K. exponentially smoothed quarterly in ‡a-tion, the return on the twenty-year government bonds, and the Hodrick and Prescott (1997) …ltered estimate of the GDP business cycle. The HP-estimate seems to capture fairly well the business cycle over the period considered. Moreover, there is no clear comovement between in ‡ation and the business cycle. Table A1 reports OLS regressions of our mispricing measures (" t and^ t ) on the variables meant to capture money illusion ( t , i t and log (1=i)) and the business cycle component of GDP identi…ed by the H-P …lter (ĉ t ). B_CYCLE INT 1966 1970 1974 1978 1982 1986 1994 1998 :56 47 Table 7 . Regressions on business cycle ‡uctuations, in ‡ation, nominal interest rate, and illusion proxy. Newey and West (1987) corrected t-statistics in brackets.
INF_SMOOTH
It is clear from the …rst and …fth rows of Table 7 that the business cycle has little (in the case of" t ) or no (in the case of^ t ) explanatory power for the mispricing. The remaining rows clearly show that the inclusion of the business cycle in the OLS regressions for the mispricing a) does not drive out the statistical signi…cance of t ; i t and log (1=i t ), b) does not signi…cantly change the point estimates of the elasticities of the mispricing reported in Table 1 , and c) does not increase signi…cantly our ability to explain the time variation in the mispricing (comparing Table 7 to Table 1 , we have that the increase in R 2 is ranges from 0% to 4% percent, and there is virtually no increases in the -non reported -R 2 ).
